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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the use of the body in avant-garde poetics, relating it to both
theory and contemporary culture. An outline of how the body has been depicted,
represented, and formalized in modernism is made, and contemporary issues involving the
body, from what Meredith M. Render calls the “alienability” of the body to posthuman
hybridity and technological transcendence. Language poetry, including the works of M.
SourbeSe Philip, Clark Coolidge, Steve McCaffery, Charles Bernstein, Karen Mac
Cormack, Lyn Hejinian, and Bruce Andrews is then examined for the body’s fraught usage
in a generally non-referential poetics. The body’s place in conceptual writing combines
contemporary technologies with a look back at Antonin Artaud’s corps sans organes.
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CHAPTER 1 REPRESENTATION, THE CONTEMPORARY
BODY, AND POETICS
This study examines the body in late 20th and early 21st century avant-garde
poetry, especially poetry surrounding the practices of those associated with Language and
Conceptual poetics. Such an exercise is beset by immediate problems, since the very
notion of a contemporary “avant-garde,” with its premise of prescient futurity, may seem
obsolete to many artists and critics (Carroll).

Likewise, the body itself is no easy matter

to discuss, with long-held philosophies of the body as part of the mind-body duality
(whether Platonic, Christian, Cartesian, etc.) or objectivist materialism no longer
uncontested. The contemporary body is a zone of contention, with many competing
forces, histories, technologies, and signs ensuring that there is a sense of plurality to any
acknowledgement of the body. Thinking about the body conscientiously is thus a
difficult kind of thinking, since there are always more of these various forces at play than
can be described.

If the body as a “thing” is not a single and self-identical thing, then its

expression as a sign in works of poetry which are both self-contained environments of
signs and embedded expressions of a history, an ethics, and a culture only add to the
bewildering complexity of possibilities bodies afford. This study thus can’t make
wholesale claims of what the body is or what the body does in contemporary avant-garde
poetries, since doing so would occlude the dynamism of complex potentials and uses that
any poem both takes part in and is produced-by.
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What this study can do is more modest. In the following pages a brief history of
the body in modernism and postmodernism will be sketched to show the ways the body
has been used in arts once the notion of representation was deemed to be problematic.
Poetry will be viewed as a part of culture, related to politics, social movements, science,
and philosophy.

The notion of representation is important to this study, because if

bodies no longer can be represented by conventional means, new ways of negotiating
them symbolically will be necessary.

While philosophy and theory will be covered to

address these issues in a more general sense, the specificity of a poem to present signs in
a certain configuration speaks to a different type of signification. Deciphering just what
this signification can be if it no longer seeks to represent a shared or consensus reality
will be one of the main goals. Despite the many views of postmodern thinking on the
body and culture that could render representation of the body in any singular sense
absurd, the world is undergoing a radical shift in terms of climate, environment, and
technology.

All of these shifts place their pressures on bodies, physically and

semiotically. It is the aim of this study to view avant-garde poetry not as obsolete but as
the attempt to depict a transforming world (and hence transforming bodies) in exigent
forms.
While representation of the body perhaps has never been simple throughout
history, ranging from Greek formal idealism to the chimera and monsters of symbolladen Hieronymous Bosch paintings, modernism challenged not just the object of
representation but the practice of representation, in art and society. Revolutions in
industrial production, transportation, communication (the telegraph and the radio),
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chemical and materials synthesis, and image-making helped shift society from centering
around the rural landscape to the urban center. This gave more people the opportunity
to access education and artistic forms once reserved for the elite, both enabling a different
class of artists with different preoccupations than previous generations and a different
public with different investments in the arts, enabling new sentiments like Lautréamont’s
“La poésie doit être faite par tous. Non par un” [Poetry must be made by all. Not by
one.] which challenged previously-held assumptions about art, who was entitled to highart and what the purposes of art should be (Lautréamont).

With advances in technology

came concerns of worker obsolescence, as traditional crafts were challenged by
automated manufacturing.
Just as social revolutions spread throughout Europe and beyond, avant-garde
circles were beginning to emerge. In some ways the avant-garde was a response to both
technology and capitalism, where the arts, faced with increased automation, control, and
representation through mechanical means, sought expression in the personal, the
irrational, the unconscious, and the symbolic, challenging the mechanistic worldview of
the Enlightenment which had produced the new industries and new manners of securing
control over the populace. The avant-garde also developed a market value, even as it
seemed to project itself critically against its society. The newly-emerged middle class,
now capable of supporting the arts, sometimes saw the apparent innovation of the avantgarde as a form of cultural capital or trophy investment. This in turn motivated artists to
innovate and produce novel or provocative work for remunerative rewards and
recognition, which led to formal renovation in poetry as evidenced in the proliferation of
3

verse forms, free verse poetry, and the invention of the prose poem, chromatic
experimentation and vague tonality in music, and, in painting, the rise of the sketch, the
symbolic, and the socially daring, as evidenced in the detailed corpses of Théodore
Géricault and the “obscene” paintings of new artists like Manet who painted the
controversial “Déjeuner Sur L’herbe” with the unabashed eye contact of the nude female,
or Gustave Courbet’s “L’Origin Du Monde” (1866), which depicts the genitals and
abdomen of a woman whose face is not shown. The avant-garde both challenged the
critiqueless reception of history or social influence and proffered new techniques for
expressing meaning and value for a changing culture. Republics, utopian projects, and
new political philosophies proliferated. The avant-garde reached beyond the work of
individual artists to become movements, with the impressionists and symbolists notable
in the 19th century.
The 20th century, emerging from the “art for art’s sake” of symbolism and
aestheticism, newly embarked on a rapid technological, scientific, and social revolution,
elicited the first sustained forays into abstraction, in which the figural and
representational are eschewed in deference to the purely constructive. The first decade
of the 20th century saw in painting fauvism, expressionism, constructivism, and cubism,
in music the new timbral awareness of so-called “impressionist” music, Italian futurist
noise machines, bitonality, and the rise of atonality, in poetry the last wave of symbolist
poetry, and the medium-consciousness of the verse of Mallarme or Apollinaire, where
typography and linguistic resonances both challenged reading. World War One with its
industrialized warfare that decimated countries and maimed citizens, illustrated the depth
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of social and political problems, and raised the exigence for art and expression as not just
being important for artist-individuals like Wilde’s artistic “elect” (Wilde) but instead
always depending on a culture and politics which cannot be entirely excised from
aesthetics.

In the sciences and humanities, Freud’s theories were becoming prevalent,

and relativity and quantum mechanics were starting to shake the foundations of
knowledge and reality. Art entered into an age of manifestoes and stylistic variability as
urban modernity manifested as a multiplicity of modes and perspectives.
Form, medium, and context, became increasingly important in the arts. The
cubists, Cezanne, and Matisse all emphasized the importance of the painting as a surface
to the work of art, calling for new ways to look at representations of the human body, and
new ways of projecting what it can be. At the same time, Marcel Duchamp showed that
art can be made by applying ideas to the commonplace and by making distinctions (the
infrathin) in the already-made; the radically transformative might be possible in an
object like a broom, a shovel, or a urinal, or by the mere addition of a sign in a banal
object (Duchamp). The diverse artists of Dada rebelled against societal conventions in
every artistic medium, from Hugo Ball’s sound poems comprised of “primitive” syllables
pronounced to produce effects in the absence of content (McCaffery, "Cacophany,
Abstraction, and Potentiality: The Fate of the Dada Sound Poem"), to Kurt Schwitter’s
“Merzbau” installations of ephemera and refuse sculpted into installations, to nonsense
plays, and to songs composed to the “lyrics” of newspaper articles. In music
Schoenberg’s systematic “pantonality” was being spread while others reinvested wellworn forms with shocking harmonies. In Russia poetry jumped from obscure symbolist
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poetry to the more irreverent second generation of symbolists, all the way to Khlebnikov
and Zaum, with its made-up yet evocative “transrational language” (Janacek). After the
end of World War I and the Russian Revolution, much of the exigence for Dada died out,
and many of its adherents moved on to Surrealism, which, in its form advanced by its
originator, Andre Breton, was put forth as a “social revolution” that absorbed and
refracted Freud’s theories, attempting to elevate the irrational, the unconscious, the
informal, the spontaneous, and the random. Breton saw this as emphatically acting
against society’s strictures and orders, stating “L’acte surréaliste le plus simple consiste,
revolvers aux poings, à descendre dans la rue et à tirer au hasard, tant qu’on peut, dans la
foule” [The most simple surrealist act consists of going into the street, revolvers in your
fists, and firing at hazard as much as you can, into the crowd] (Breton). With
Surrealism’s absorption into the marketplace and creative vernacular, and the increasing
conservatism and despotism of regimes across Europe, avant-garde experimentation and
provocation became less recognized and celebrated until the end of the second World
War.
The modernist project effectively modified conceptions of what bodies could be
while not unconditionally accepting past models of the body. The body could be thought
of in terms of a new materiality, not as a singular object but as the result of interacting
perspectives, or collations or collages of disparate elements on a unified plane, or even, in
the case of the Italian Futurists as a machine which, in the future, would meld with
technology or be sacrificed to the improvements advanced by such technology
(Marinetti). Formalism was explored along many lines of language to fashion bodies not
6

just which were representations, but which arose out of specific possibilities, whether
from the phonemic play of Hugo Ball or Khlebnikov, taking the basic elements of speech
production, available to many languages and culture, and expressing something
(allegedly) independent of any, which served to stress the value of vocal production and
perception (both corporeal processes), to the syntactic instrumentation of Gertrude
Stein’s writing, bending and twisting language to make novel forms, to James Joyce’s
Ulysses, where, on one hand, the body was looked at in an uncommon alimentarydigestive manner, serving to sanction all bodily processes as worthy of representation in
art, while, on the other hand, experimenting in polystylism, perspective, and pastiche,
which effectively rendered the body not as the standard of the self’s relation to reality,
but as a production that is contingent on a number of factors, a choice and matter of style
and technique, illustrating the intimate connection between meaning, material, and
technique.
The effect of cubism and futurism on the body was that the body is not just
something which is seen as a received and recognized form—in a field of interacting
shapes devoid of the illusionistic modeling of light that would give a sense of contour and
texture, the body can be discovered. This body, assembled in a way that runs contrary to
previously communicated experience, with different rules bearing on it than medical
science (which has always, from humeral science, to mesmerism, to 20th century
electroconvulsive therapy and lobotomies, been constructive, even if it purports to be
analytical), thus affords us a chance to think about ourselves in new ways, as a series of
glances, as views from different reference points, as always being styled in some way, as
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operants in systems, and as part of dynamism and energetic flux. Modernism also gave
rise to early conceptualism, where not just the utilitarian conventions of objects but also
the designatory and symbolic elements we bring to it, inform materials.
While socially and politically modernism straddled many movements and
philosophies, there was an increasing stress on the social and political in art, dissolving
the boundaries between aesthetics and ethics, which made representations of bodies not
merely significant on aesthetic and intellectual valences but also as actors in the world.
The endless combinations that surrealistic juxtaposition exuded gave bodies the ability to
be conceived as anything, with any means, challenging some of modernism’s tendencies
to systemic thinking, and challenging the value of ossified and static thought. Whereas
earlier modernism challenged historical conceptions of the body, offering new formal
means of expressing bodies analogous to many of the intellectual and technological
revolutions of the time, surrealism challenged the authoritativeness of any representation.
For the conception of bodies, this allows for a generative potential when, before, bodies
required materials, ideas, or means to be produced or described. Although this flaunts
absurdity as the primary derived signification of the represented body, it opens the body
up to “nonrepresentational,” cultural, and anti-systemic modes that become important to
postmodern discourse.
The Second World War was a ubiquitous trauma. The experiments of
Modernism to challenge prevailing tastes, ideas, and preconceptions of society proved
insufficient to counter humankind’s capacity to design weapons of mass destruction,
cruelty, torture, with new modes of delivering war to the very urban centers upon whose
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shoulders modernists stood. If the modernist tendency to pastiche, to distort, and to
reframe suggested a jaded indifference or even a sense of having transcended cultural and
semiotic norms, the Second World War showed that there is no total neutrality.
Intellectual movements of the earlier 20th century often stressed system, from Saussure’s
course on general linguistics and its followers in many disciplines, to Freud, who sought
to track neuroses to causes and primal drives, to behaviorism, to logical positivism with
its atomic view of language, to set theory in mathematics.

Even more evidently-

individualistic forms of intellectualism like phenomenology, which studied experience as
the only form of knowledge, were at least related to system, including Martin
Heidegger’s infamous Nazi membership and a postwar French philosophy divided, in
part, along Résistance participations. Surrealism, which would seem to have no relation
to ideology, had allied itself with various forms of communism, with many members
initially enthusiastic about Soviet communism and many public rifts and schisms about
what system of communism was to be supported (the movement’s most famous painter,
Salvatore Dali, was dismissed from the group with the anagram of his name, “Avida
Dollars”).
While the war by no means ended systematic thinking, it effectively showed how
contingent all cultural production is, how censorship can facilitate repression, and how
the formal revolutions that had swept over every branch of aesthetics are insufficient in
themselves to effect the sorts of social changes their creators often conceived as attending
their work. The experiments of the avant-garde lost their sense of futurity, no longer
serving as the standard vanguard of cultural possibilities but rather showing how these
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examples failed to serve the actual demands of the time, allowing atrocities to occur.
After the Second World War artists and intellectuals no longer could solely invest their
thoughts in medium and form. Many felt the need to rebuild a society which would not
commit the same errors as previous generations. This led to a fervor in systemsthinking. In music composers like Pierre Boulez and Karlheinz Stockhausen rigorously
composed works that employed crystalline patterns over most conceivable variables of
musical composition, including pitch, rhythm, tempo, dynamics, and even timbre.
Picasso-derived analytical abstraction became de rigeur. The structural innovation of
Saussurean linguistics was applied to fields like anthropology, and mass culture was
formally analyzed. Intellectuals were at pains to try to harmonize Marxism with the
writings of Freud.
But system and rigor were also being challenged with equal insistence. The
informal and formless were to preoccupy artists to an unprecedented degree. In France,
Georges Bataille, a one-time member of surrealism (himself “excommunicated” from the
group as a “philosophe-excrément”) who balked at the movement’s idealism, theorized
on formlessness, “nonknowledge,” excess, and evil to challenge what he considered to be
the illusory integrity of capitalistic, fascistic, and social ideologies. Nontraditional
figures were being looked to as viable producers of art, unspoiled by the academy or
culture.

Figures like Jean Genet emerged from the underground to international cultural

acclaim. The artist Jean Dubuffet curated shows of works of institutionalized mental
patients who seemed to be heedless of aesthetic conventions. Authenticity, immediacy,
and energy became emphasized.
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Although abstraction was by no means new to the postwar period, it received new
attention as being a way out of modernism’s labyrinth into something more appropriate
for the new society.

Abstract expression gained notoriety for its shift of thinking from

art as an object to art as process and event. In physics cloud chambers allowed scientists
to track the motions of electrons in glass vessels, leaving physical traces for something
that otherwise would be too small and mobile to observe.

Jackson Pollock, building on

a drip technique pioneered by André Masson and other surrealists, emerged from relative
obscurity by making dynamic paintings that depicted nothing identifiable while recording
his gestures, energies, and forces. The body was not being depicted, yet paintings were
emerging from the body, testifying to the body’s presence, its choices, tics, movements,
and insistence in a novel way. The result was tangles of tracks, blots, and traces, dizzying
and with no definite primary orientation. This effectuated a powerful critique against
structure.
While structure was still going strong midcentury with figures like Le Corbusier,
Xenakis, and Piet Mondrian in favor, abstraction was able to critique conventions of
form. While Mondrian divided canvases up into geometric sections in which primary
colors, with relatively little nuance, were applied inside hard lines, Mark Rothko
developed canvases of fields of color, which, although divided, were done so without
absolute boundaries, the fields composed of minute variations so that even this “flat”
painting composed of a division into geometrical objects might appear to be systemic,
upon closer inspection it escapes the strictures it would first appear to insinuate. The
paintings of Wols were rife with organic suggestion, from cell-forms and bacilli, yet
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suggested not biological determinism but complexity and dynamism. Franz Kline’s
stark gestural paintings, alongside the more excessive drawings of Henri Michaux, took
the beams, dashes, crossings, spots, and arcs familiar to alphabets and script and
deployed them asemically, assembling something like a script without words or a sign for
something which has not been otherwise designated by practice.
Indeterminacy became a sort of catchphrase. The composer John Cage wrote
aleatory music, where the performer gets to choose what to play, thereby eschewing the
view of absolute art dependent on a solitary creator. Cage also brought his innovations
to writing, where he popularized the mesostich and “writing through,” using a given text
and erasing or otherwise eliding its contents to either nonlocal linguistic connections or to
make novel combinations using only recycled material. Logic and the sciences
themselves seemed to hint at indeterminacy being fundamental to systems-thinking, as in
the case of Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem, or nature itself, like in Heisenberg’s
Uncertainty theorem in quantum mechanics, which uses zones of probability rather than
the precise coordinates of classical mechanics to describe what is hypothesized to be
impossible to be completely described for a specific moment in time. Wittgenstein’s
Philosophical Investigations asserted that many intellectual problems arise out of
language, yet language was something that never could totalize the world, even when
reduced to its simplest statements, such as in the case of urging actions in relation to
deictics.
Abstraction challenged the hegemony of signification, allowing for bodies to be
thought of in other ways than as objects of representation in the arts. Textual practices
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like John Cage’s encouraged thinking about embedded representation, of receiving a code
and altering it using its own constituent parts; a body can thus emerge from something
quite different, or the inorganic or conceptual from the physical. Antonin Artaud wrote,
in the radio play “Pour en finir avec le judgement de dieu,” about a “corps sans organes,”
a body that is not institutionalized, instrumentalized, placed under the strictures of any
social, political, or ethical program, any teleology or rationalism, that is its own brute
experience divested of any of the occluding signs or directives which are induced into its
signification (Artaud). New logics based on discontinuity and indefiniteness could
produce bodies which are not completely circumscribed by rational proportions but
which are under flux, porous, and constructive.
The arts and culture went through drastic changes in the decades following the
Second World War.

In America feminism and the civil rights movement began their

attempt to give platforms for those denied voices, marginalized, and oppressed.
Television and the radio made the diffusion of images and ideas instantaneous, even as it
threatened society with a consensus culture with standards of beauty, propriety, and
values. The art world began to view abstraction as passé, missing out on the cultural
exchanges then taking place. Pop Art emerged and with it, repackaging consumer
culture as commentary on the contemporary world, ambiguously capitalizing on it or
providing Duchampian conceptual critique, depending on your taste. The Beats, the
Hippies, drug culture, and the “sexual revolution” challenged convention along different
lines than figuration or abstraction, including cultural sampling, like the Beatles using
sitars and popularizing meditation, and questioning social practices themselves, not
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merely cultural representations.

The art now challenged traditional concepts of

authenticity and creativity, directly critiqued or took part in society, and staged events or
interventions with the innovation of performance art. In one moment in one place art
seemed to consist solely of packaging. In another moment, elsewhere, art was
purposefully ephemeral. In Japan a Gutai painter might labor over a canvas in a public
setting only to burn it once it was complete. Performances and multimedia happenings
stressed experience over products which inevitably turn to commodities. Boundaries
which had seemed sacrosanct were now being effaced. Protests, armed forces, and
manifestoes spread, and, along with them critiques of colonial powers, repressive
regimes, and mistreatment of people based on gender or race proliferated.
Postmodernism, which had been stewing in intellectual circles since the postwar period,
was developing a new and multitudinous form in the social dynamism of the 60s.
If critique and concept were at the vanguard of this movement, the body enjoyed
renewed attention.

The formalism of minimalism was subverted by female artists like

Eva Hesse and Yayoi Kusama, who reinvested the minimalism’s tendency to make
rigidly geometric or gridded art with suggestive and teeming organic forms.
Underground films gave people with nonnormative sexualities or identities an
opportunity to express themselves as themselves. Video art, like Richard Serra’s “Hand
Catching Lead” (1968) was capable of showing the body doing things that often escape
notice, or by introducing abstraction or conceptualism into bodily movements. At the
same time, the body itself was becoming a medium for art. The Vienna Actionists
staged events which included masturbation, anointing themselves with feces, lashing
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themselves, and cutting themselves to push the body to extremes. In 1971 Chris Burden,
for a performance piece entitled “Shoot,” had an assistant shoot him in the arm with a .22
caliber rifle. The paintings of Francis Bacon gained notoriety, with their corporeal
obsessiveness, their focus on meat, flayed bodies, the exposure of the body’s interior to
the external environment, as well as its different perspectives gleaned from mechanical
forms of recording and printing and imaging techniques that enabled the body’s interior
to be seen.
The postmodern body was at risk and fragile at turns, violent and transgressive at
others. Sometimes it was coded with overwhelming complexity, comprised of so many
different sources that it was difficult to make sense of, like in some of Bacon’s portraits,
while, at others consisting of a disarming simplicity, like Richard Serra’s video of a
human hand doing a repetitive task and getting progressively dirtier in the process.
While images of war were broadcast through homes across America, and countries
fought for their sovereignty against colonial powers, and while sex and sexuality were
brought out of hiding into cultural discourse, intellectuals were dismantling systems and
providing means of appraising a culture which had become heterogenous.
Situationalism was born, attempting to appeal to a younger generation, to critique cultural
commodification and redefine urban spaces. Deconstruction, championed by Derrida,
showed how language is never one definite and total thing, that even the most concerted
language often works to undo some of what it systematizes. In the Americas, Erving
Goffman critiqued social institutions and illustrated how the self, rather than being the
emblem of some untrammeled identity, is largely constructed by the society in which the
15

individual finds her or himself. Roland Barthes famously called for the death of the
notion of the author, and with it the birth of the text. The notion of “discourse” became
increasingly important to thought, with Michel Foucault pioneering postmodern views on
sexuality, finding the notion of sexual of identity to be largely a production of discourses
that constituted it; by this discourse it can be regulated, so even the seemingly liberatory
significance of sexual expression can be indicative to being part of a framework of
imposed power (Foucault).
While postmodernity’s critical toolkit included ways of viewing discourse,
representation, and expression as elusive, indefinite, yet always subject to issues of
control, and the postmodern body was becoming increasingly polyvocal and
heterogenous, technology, economics, and politics were rapidly altering cultures
worldwide.

If quantum mechanics’ haziness and relativity’s complexity introduced

strangeness and the indefinite into cultural consciousness, the discovery of DNA and the
rapid progress of computing changed the sense on not just what we are but what we can
become in ways that became inextricable from the body. Medical imaging advanced
from X-rays to MRI, fMRI, CAT scans, and PET scans, allowing the interior of the body
to be viewed for both diagnostic and research purposes. Computing power and access
multiplied rapidly, and with this advancement came computer’s shift from being capable
of modeling aspects of reality, like Lorenz’s groundbreaking nonlinear modeling of
weather forecasting in 1963 to contemporary computing’s ability to simulate reality or
alter users’ experiences of reality.
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With this unprecedented advance in technologies becomes a pressure for the
contemporary body to be redefined, to be given new boundaries and parameters in order
to situate it with the changing awareness of how the body operates and what operates on
the body. Since we are now able to extract DNA, to take biopsies, develop cell cultures,
extract eggs and sperm cells, blood, plasma, and marrow, remove tumors and organs,
embryos, fetuses, and stem cells, bodily identity has become increasingly complex and
difficult to negotiate.

In 1990 the California Supreme Court ruled in Moore v. Regents

of the University of California, that John Moore, who had been treated for hairy-cell
leukemia, did not have the right to ownership or compensation for the white blood cell
line cultivated by his doctors from his spleen’s tissue (Render). The ruling challenges
contemporary notions of the body, its extent, and the complex notions of rights and even
ownership with respect to bodies. No consent was asked of Moore, nor was he made
aware of any potential uses of his bodily materials. It is uncertain where bodies end and
impersonal biological material begins, yet nearly every human body now can be priced
by its constituent parts for the medical industry. Meredith M. Render writes that it is
now “beyond dispute that the human body’s capacities have become increasingly
alienable” (Render).
This alienability is one of the contemporary conditions of the body, a body which
now has a capacity for otherness distinct from Cartesian mind-body dualities or the
Christian view of the body as degraded and contingent, compared to the purity of the
soul. The new alienability is no longer merely an “other-than,” a determination of
heterogeneity and difference, but is also an “other-for,” an alterity not just of matter but
17

of service, which situates the body and its parts as a differential complex of economic
potentials and social controls (a ruling for Moore would have altered the medicaltechnological industry in such a way that patients could profit from their own procedures,
reducing profit margins for the industry, as well as affecting changes to the law and rights
associated to the body whose ramifications could be far-reaching and various). New
modes of visualizing the body, of differentiating it into parts, of quantifying it, of valuing
it, makes for a body that is no longer just personal. There are others who can use it, and
due to the increased specialization of sciences and technology, there are others who can
use it in ways we cannot. The body extends past sensation and even mechanism to
features and capacities whose relevance or value may be unknown to the individual. To
be other-for is to know that even the bodily integrity that seems to be a human right has
its limits when economics and control are involved. The heterogeneity that characterizes
the contemporary mind can also be applied to the contemporary body, to redefine what it
is or isn’t, what it can do, what can be done to it, for whom and for what.

If différance

shows that signification is never exact, and that, consequently, any system structured by
signs can never be absolutely integral, the alienability of the contemporary body shows
that even things as seemingly fundamental and inherent as material and identity can be
subjected to the same process of heterogeneity, distinction, and alterity.
Modern medicine’s pharmaceuticals, treatments, imaging, surgical interventions, its
capacity to document, reproduce, and alter genetic code, its reproductive capacities, and
its ability to craft inorganic implants ranging from structural rods and plates to artificial
organs helps contribute to what David Le Breton calls le corps brouillard, a tendency for
18

“technocratic” contemporaries to view the body as a rough draft, something which can be
improved by purchases meant to rectify its flaws (Le Breton). If communes were the
sites of utopias in the 19th century, ranging from Coleridge’s pantisocracy to Oneida
Christian communism, and modernism staked some of its more utopian dreams on the
perfection of cities from the futurist idealization of technology and skyscrapers to the
surrealist fascination with randomness in urban interactions like the proto-dérive of
Nadja, the contemporary body has also become the cite of utopian idealism. The body is
now cite + site, an always unfinished signifying canvas and the arena in which the
individual interfaces with the world. Judith Butler, David Le Breton, Christine Detrez,
Bernard Andrieu, and many other theorists have shown how the human body can be
viewed as a cultural construct, conditioned from infancy to construe every aspect of its
significance and functioning towards some end, ranging from the differences male and
female infants are treated physically and linguistically (Butler), to the way fairy tales tend
to valorize beauty and problematize “ugliness” (Detrez), to medical literature’s
descriptions of surgical interventions of pregnant women as being for “the couple” or
“the fetus” rather than stating that the procedure is being conducted in the woman’s own
body (Van der Ploeg), to the more conspicuous conditioning by modern media with the
production and distribution of idealized male and female forms, bodies are not just matter
but a subject materialism affected by countless and nearly-constant force vectors. The
idea of control then, of willing the body to conform to one’s own views, is prevalent in
our culture. Parents may give boys who don’t meet up with average growth
development rates human growth hormones to conform with societal expectations.
People may become addicted to bodybuilding, regimenting their diet and exercise to
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“sculpt” their body. Body dysmorphia and eating disorders are increasingly common
when social media and the ubiquity of media become standard. Even phenomena like
cutting attest to the importance of the body to contemporary individuality.

While these

disorders are prevalent in contemporary society, idealism of the body’s role in society
and society’s future are not diminished.
While theorists ponder the human-technology hybrid “cyborg” as a possibility (or
inevitability) as humankind develops an ever-greater sophistication of technology and
intimacy with technology, the body is being considered as being “posthuman,” extending
beyond its biological capacities. The ramifications for this theoretical field and the body
are endless due to the combinatorial potential of hybridity yet little-known, practically.
There is a current vogue among some to take part in what is called “body-hacking,”
which Peoc’h and Druel define as a “forme de modification corporelle s’attache à
augmenter l’humain par le biais de la technologie pour lui donner des capacitiés
supérieures à la nature” [a form of corporeal modification that strives to augment the
human by technological means to give the human capabilities superior to those of
nature](133) David le Breton ascribes to the posthumanists a sort of “gnostic thinking”
of the body’s base nature adapted to contemporary technology. Body Hackers, often
people without medical degrees and surgical training, perform operations like inserting a
magnet under the skin that enables the person to detect subtle variations in the electric
field.

While the movement is nascent and relatively unsophisticated, despite the efforts

of its pioneer Kevin Warwick who calls it a “science fiction becoming a reality” (Peoc’h,
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Druel), it address a contemporary hope of progress that is situated, not in agrarian plots or
constructed metropolises but in the body.
The poetics of the contemporary body is heterogenous. On one hand the body is
constructed by a culture, and one’s own body now has an alterity that is not just a
differential alienation but an “other-for.” Our systems of representation have ventured
from attempts at “realistic” modeling to symbolism, to abstraction and attempted
asemiology. Bodies are subject to discrimination, war, and torture, which all find new
means as technologies change. The same technology that allows the average person
greater access to information, to the ability to communicate at great distances instantly
via various modalities, develops pilotless drones that can kill from different continents at
the press of a button. Just as the concept of value or capital emerged from the
capitalistic economic system in such a way as to be universally applicable, quantifying
anything from air to the stem cells of fetuses, the concept of information or data is now
ubiquitous, which users constantly emitting their location via their smartphones, their
movements and heart rates with tools like the Fitbit, and even details about sexuality with
Wifi enabled vibrators that offer users interactions with remote partners (Wilson-Barnao,
Collie). In many cases accrued data may not even be viewed by humans, yet often
derives from bodies and is used in ways that impact bodies. While the posthumanist or
transhumanist body may locate idealizations of the body and technology as the next
utopia, it can still highlight the linguistic turns of the body in contemporary society.
Kevin Warwick speaks of the poverty of human communication, elaborating that “human
language is sequential, subject to errors, and an incredibly slow way to communicating
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with others. Our coding procedures called ‘language’ severely restrain our intellect”
(Warwick). Contemporary poetics, moving past concepts of representation and
abstraction, address our current heterogenous and alienable bodies by addressing
Warwick’s concerns, both with novel means to adapt language to be polysemic and not
sequential, while also focusing on these “poverties” of language.
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CHAPTER 2 LANGUAGE POETRY AND THE BODY
Language poetry emerged in the late sixties as a critique of institutional control of
language, the social and individual effects of such control, as well as the prevailing
fashion of poetry to be confessional, which produced at times a consensus poetry
centered around the individual ego. The end of the sixties witnessed a withering status,
among young intellectuals, of the institutions through which culture is codified and
transmitted. If the prevailing culture is what produces race-based violence or unjustified
foreign war, intellectuals questioned traditional modes of discourse and artistic creation
as suspect for belonging to that culture. If the ego or self as a congealed form of identity
was the ultimate basis of artistic expression, as the confessional poets had it, why was the
ultimate authenticity of such expression bound up with dissolution of identity, mental
illness, or madness, exemplified by its figureheads in Robert Lowell and Sylvia Plath?
Language poetry radically challenged both these domains of language, the isolated or
insular ego and the totalizing cultural system.
By what Bob Perelman calls “verbal fracturing” (Perelman 64), the sense of
wholeness that systemic forms of discourse convey is disrupted and reoriented to ends
which are not necessarily definite and thus not capable of imposing power to the same
clear teleological ends as are achievable by conventional (and conventionalizing)
language. This fracturing broke away from the schematic quality of the confessional
verse that had come to pervade the poetic mainstream. The fracturing of language also
fractures the author, who no longer is the justifying manufacturer for a work of poetry but
one agent in a problematized, radicalized field that does not enforce identity but questions
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the means by which identity is communicated, by institutions, art, authors, and readers.
Steve Mccaffery describes this act as a “fundamental repudiation of the socially defined
functions of author and reader as the productive and consumptive poles respectively of a
commodital axis” (North 15).
The means to achieving this verbal fracturing are diverse, even if, fifty years into
the language turn in poetry, there are several stereotypes about the poetics of Language
poetry that would make it seem as if the writing was to some extend rote or otherwise
ossified into certain technical motifs. From the titles of Language poetry volumes alone,
much can be inferred about the way language is treated: there is the potential tmesis of
David Melnick’s PCOET, which splinters into divagations of pronunciation and
referentiality; Ron Silliman’s N/O, which splits a word and recalls the I/O of electrical
terminology; and Alan Davies’ A AN AV ES, deleting characters from his name in order
to get to elementary syllables which either are a part of the English language or are not,
without hierarchizing either. Just from these titles, before a single poem is even read, we
experience a language which has nonstandard additions, creating resonant nonwords, the
use of symbol to split words into parts, and the employment of omission to reveal latent
semiotic possibilities in words which may have seemed stratified, as in the name of a poet
or the sign of language itself, as in Language poetry’s adoption of
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E as a sign to show the operative and semiotic potential of
linguistic modifications. Another technique is typographical and spatial. Many poems
by Steve McCaffery and Susan Howe treat poems as language that has not only been
modified in order to highlight the materiality of language use but also to use written
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language’s spatiality to perform additional operations that the linear form of poetry
cannot do. Shapes, design, fragmentation, modifications of angle, differing degrees of
darkness, and overlaying enable signs to employ both the polysemy endemic to language
as well as novel configurations, combinations, trajectories, and means of organizing signs
that further what Barrett Watten calls Language poetry’s “radical particularity,” its
complexity, contingency, opacity, and unsublatability—its defiance of the whole,
whether a canonical reading of a line, a unitary paraphrase of an entire poem, or the
poem’s coherent absorption into aesthetic, cultural, social, and political discourses
(Watten).
Language Poetry, despite the immense technical resources opened up by those
modes of deletion, addition, and splitting of signs, as well as concrete-poetry like
spatialization, is more known for its poetics of parataxis and what is known as the new
sentence. Parataxis is the adjacent positioning of phrases, clauses, or syntactical units
without indicating relationship or hierarchy. Karen Mac Cormack’s opening stanza from
embrace illustrates parataxis at work:
Tree in the shape of voices is shine by comparison broken.
Terse ligaments an Alhambra to live by, or mate equals conquer on par.
The adamant if loadstone falling of fill.
Type of bread.
Weathered [Tale Light, 61]
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In this poem, syntactical units do not relate according to linguistic convention. Nouns
are used in ambiguous ways, with novel relations to modifiers like “Terse ligaments”
which modifies anatomy with a language-based term, and there is even some ambiguity
of their status as nouns, since words like “shine,” “mate,” “fill” also function as verbs.
The conjunction “if” is used in a novel way in line three, because “adamant if loadstone”
could be interpreted in a Noun If Noun schema, which is linguistically unusual without
greater linguistic structures to contextualize or structure the form, like “One by one I
substituted one rock for another. Rhodochrosite if I saw amethyst. Amazonite if
chalcedony. Adamant if loadstone.” The line lacks, however, such context, and,
indeed, only adds to the difficulty in parsing with the more common meaning of adamant
as an adjective of determination. The line is made even more complex with the inclusion
of “falling of fill,” possibly combining verb forms via a preposition, which is a
nonstandard linguistic structure and thus lacks a conventional interpretation. Parataxis
thus works to multiply potential interpretations of a line or poem by working at a material
level on the language used, sometimes in such a way to ambiguate units of a line or
sentence, sometimes in a way to alter the part of speech of a word or its agreement,
parallelism, or syntactical relation to other words in the sentence or line, and sometimes
to form novel grammatical configurations.
The “New Sentence” is the other well-known (and stereotyped) technique of
language poetry. It was formulated by Ron Silliman as a linguistic-aesthetic critique of
capitalism and words’ tendencies to not only find themselves attached to commodities,
but to “become commodities” (New Sentence 8). The New Sentence is in part a critique
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of novelistic referentiality, which Silliman ties with the commodification of language, a
commodification that has been growing since the advent of the printing press, forcing the
word to “become transparent” in the reference of the object. This transparency is flawed
in that the word is a material (read opaque) signifier and not the object referenced,
operating in a linguistic system not the fetishistic symbolic currency of capitalism. The
New Sentence formulated by Silliman would thus foreground language and challenge
referentiality. Silliman himself offered a complex definition on what this sentence
would be:
1) The paragraph organizes the sentences;
2) The paragraph is a unity of quantity, not logic or argument;
3) Sentence length is a unit of measure;
4) Sentence structure is altered for torque, or increased polysemy/ambiguity;
5) Syllogistic movement is (a) limited; (b) controlled;
6) Primary syllogistic movement is between the preceding and following
sentences;
7) Secondary syllogistic movement is toward the paragraph as a whole, or the
total work;
8) The limiting of syllogistic movement keeps the reader’s attention at or very
close to the level of language, that is, most often at the sentence level or below.
(New Sentence, 91)
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Some of the salient features of the New Sentence are thus in terms of logic and reasoning,
with Silliman insisting that paragraphs cannot be paraphrastic with unitary glosses or
chains of reasoning, and that any given sentence avoids a logical relationship to the
preceding or following sentence. The result of this is wide ranging. The New Sentence,
unlike the paratactic line, can seemingly be clear, comprised of interpretable and
seemingly referential units. This is different than some of the more extreme expressions
of Language poetry which systematically dissolve referentiality, like this moment in
Bruce Andrews’ “Swaps Ego” that proceeds from the elision of letters to the point where
the remaining letters seem to make elementary syllables and rudimentary words of their
own:
Bo Reason A

In Ga e Water e on Atoni Barten er C ore

Do Du in U y Mat

Sti

Last Laure s S o ar

Fa I y Do tor

Ja a Bu a y Pa G a y Di Da e Bea I P ea a…[Andrews 123]
The New Sentence teases meaning, only to render it complex and opaque through the
sentence’s relations with other sentences. Poem 46 from Lyn Hejinian’s “The
Unfollowing” begins:
A dream is a poor location for memories of things one hasn’t noticed, things
scarcely worth noticing
Whew—my head is like a chrysanthemum held upright on my neck
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Underwriting the stick figure with its stock-still demeanor is its caption: “A
Minute
Goes By”
Figs on a spot
In due course anti-lions and anti-asps will befriend wandering humans on sailing
ships propelled by calm . . . [The Unfollowing, 58]
Here each sentence or line behaves as we would expect a sentence to behave. Yet, in
reading sentence after sentence, we experience something like the unresolvable units of
parataxis, except now they are tied by a more or less coherent utterance.
Reference this is upended at various levels in Language Poetry. Steve McCaffery
called reference “that kind of blindness a window makes of the pane it is; that motoric
thrust of the word which takes you out of language into a tenuous world of the other and
so prevents you seeing what it is you see” (“The Death of the Subject”). The
referentiality of a word is in some ways illusory, much like how altering intensities of
colors on a more or less flat canvas can give the illusion of depth; a word is uttered or
printed, having a material, spatial, or temporal existence that differs from the referential
object, having no necessary connection other than convention. As Silliman’s critique
suggests, reference is by no means an innocent illusion—it helps undergird the politicaleconomic system, has its share in economic inequity and power relations of subjugation
and authority.

Language poetry sees reference as a blindness to the actual linguistic acts
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being made. By operating on language to make language apparent, reference itself is
critiqued.
The body is a fraught space, a fraught object, and a fraught sign in such poetry.
A body is something whole, a container for transcendental differences of body and mind,
interior and exterior, matter and consciousness. Parts connect to parts, making references
complex, tending to insinuate a tacit completeness. If I write about a “living hand” the
hand is bound up with associations of what a hand does—write, touch, grip, feel—and
where a hand is situated. It would not be a living hand if not connected to a living wrist,
in turn connected to a living forearm, elbow, upper arm, shoulder, etc. This sense of
belonging makes Language Poetry’s task more difficult. If I am attempting “radical
particularity” describing lips might not be practically radical—as much as we imagine, as
Wilde did with Salome’s famous kiss of the decapitated Iokanaan, a mouth as an abstract
unit, it still expresses its membership in a larger collection of parts or unity, even if we
may employ surreal descriptions like a “faceless mouth” to try to undo such referentiality.
Linguistic operations can in fact enhance the embodiedness of body references, like M.
Philip NourbeSe’s “bod y” refrain in Zong!, which focalizes not merely the fragmentation
of the material bodies of the murdered slaves of the text, but also serves to heal such
fragmentation—the d and the y are within reach, although the y and the why, the
reasoning of this schism are irreducibly gapped, taken in with the same glance, connected
by the reader. In a paratactic context, the body can form a node of signification that,
even in the chaos of otherwise jostling fragmentary signifiers, does not cease to signify
some form of wholeness. The New Sentence may step over such concerns, with its
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tendency of being locally coherent on the sentence level, thus making the body
unproblematic, yet, if the poet is to avoid “syllogisms” on the level of surrounding
sentences or even paragraph or stanza level, then the body is best avoided in order to
avoid falling into fetishization.
Despite all of these hazards, the body and its parts is employed in Language
Poetry. It is used less, perhaps, than in many other schools or trends of poetry, and it is
used in different ways, since it so easily transcendentalizes to wholenesses, identities, or
objects. Language poetry has to be careful, if it is to remain radical, to not allow the
body to infect the poem with connections that contradictorily cohere the poem into
resolution and undo the poem’s project. If the materiality of the body is overstressed or
used too conventionally in the Language Poem, cultural norms can cause the poem to
seemingly support agendas or worldviews inimical to the poet. If the phenomenology of
the body is too emphatic, idealizations might sneak into the poem that counteract the
Language Poem’s intense specificity that paradoxically enables polysemic potentials to
emerge from the texture of a text. The body can swerve from one axis of materiality to
another axis of idealization.
Clark Coolidge’s series of poems, “Diamonds,” written in 1966 are formatted
visually to appear as page-centered diamonds consisting of 169 3-letter words. The poem
beginning “ace” appears thusly:
ace
act ado
add aft ago
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age aha aid aim
ail air ale all alp
amp and ant any ape arc
are arc arm art ash ask asp
ass ate awe awk awl axe aye any
bad bag bah bam ban bar bat bay bed
bee beg bet bib big bin bit boa bob bog
boo bop bow box boy bub bud bug bum bun bus
but bye cab cad cam can cap car cat caw cob cog
cod con coo cop cot cow coy cry cub cud cue cup cur
cut dab dad dam day deb den dew did die dig dim
duo dye ear eat ebb eek eel egg ego elf
eye fab fad fag fan far fat fax
fay fee fen few fib fig fin
fir fit fix flue fly fob
fog fop fry fun fur
gab gad gag gal
gam gap gar
gas gat
gay
[Coolidge, 30]
The many constraints are obvious. The words are mostly—but not always—in
alphabetical order. Each row increases by one word until the middle line of the diamond,
which contains 13 words, and then the rows decrease by one word until only containing a
single word. Such a relentless structure would seem to equalize all of the words, to place
equal importance on their appearance in the diamond. Yet there are words in significant
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places, like “ace,” “cod,” “cur,” and “gay” which are located at the vertices of the
diamond. There are also words that compose each of the edges of the diamond, which
makes a readerly distinction between inner and outer. The body appears in the diamond
with such entries as “arm,” “ass,” “ear,” and “eye.” Due to the strictures of the poem
and their lack of any functional syntactical articulation—it is not an arm that does
anything; it is not an eye that looks at anything—the body parts enter into a symmetrical
relationship with other words, including words like “ado” or “far” which are different
parts of speech. By instituting this sameness of diversity, qualities and functions can be
dispersed or shared. If the words are all more-or-less equal members of an array of
similar atoms, the body words’ referentiality is diminished, allowing the body to be
thought in terms of form, not of its material reference, but of its signifiers and their
relationship to other signifiers.
Due to the inner outer form and vertices, however, this might be an incomplete
dissolution of reference. Is there some kind of relationship among “ace,” “cur,” “cod,”
and “gay”? Cod is Middle English for testicles—hence codpieces worn by dancers—
adding an anatomical resonance to the hinges of the diamond. Ace and cur could be
polarized assessments, and gay, located at the bottom of the diamond, could lead to a
confessional-style of reading the diamond. Looking at the edges of the diamond, on the
left side there are three anatomical words (granting cod to be one), “ass,” “cod,” “gam,”
and “eye.” On the right side of the diamond there are none. Is this simply a quirk of the
systematic construction of the poem, a chance occurrence arisen from the alphabetical
arrangement of three-letter words? Or is there some significance that, in a poem where
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the word, “gay,” conspicuous and alone at the lower extreme of the page, the left, the
sinister side of the poem, contains reference to male genitalia, the ass, a feminine
signifier for a leg, and the eye? While such a reading may be forced, it illustrates how
difficult it is for Language Poets to express the body as a formal language unit relating
through language and design to other language units. Even in a poem as rigorous as this,
the body extends from the page, tending towards a wholeness quite apart from the means
of the poem.
Coolidge’s diamond poem “mat” consists solely of the words “mat,” “bow,” “lip,”
“urn,” and “ken” presented always in that order. All of the words are nouns of physical
things except for “ken,” which references a span of knowledge or sight. The poem is like
a serial composition in movement, with the same units with the same relationship to each
other. Such an array ensures that the words are experienced as patterns rather than
statements. Despite this there are quirks. The series is unfinished at the bottom of the
diamond, ending on “urn” not “ken”; all of the object words have been repeated 34 times,
but “ken” and its reference to knowing has only appeared 33 times in the diamond. Is
this once again a necessary outcome of the poem’s design, or does the omission of “ken”
hint at a preference of materiality to the signified or ideality? The body word “lip” seems
to have no special importance not reserved for the other words, yet it does not appear on
any of the left side’s edges, appearing eight times on the diamond’s right edges. Thus,
while the body loses reference as such to a materiality, it acquires a sense of signification
of form (three letters), order or belonging (third in the series), and even suggests a sense
of chirality, a tendency towards the right or an aversion from the left, spatializing the
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signifier even as it seems to obey all of the rules that determine each of the series’
members. Coolidge’s construction allows for parts of the body to enter into deep
relationship with other signifiers, to assume novel properties, and to assume relationships
to space that differ from the parts’ words’ relationship to conventions of space.
In 1967 Coolidge wrote “Suite V,” presenting spatialized text not as serialized or
ordered sequences of words but as minimal dipoles, where one four letter word ending
with “s” is centered near the top of the page and another four letter word ending with “s”
is centered towards the bottom of the page. In one poem of this suite, “cans” is printed
towards the top and “arms” is printed towards the bottom (Coolidge 63). The page is
mostly blank, yet “cans” appears directly above “arms.” The two words may at first
appear simple. Cans is a plural of an object-word, and arms are body parts. Is there
some sort of dissonance here, between the inertness and thinginess of cans, given visual
priority at the top of the page, and arms, alive but visually subsidiary. The words
themselves, however, have other meanings. “Cans” are slang for women’s breast, so the
seeming thinginess of cans can be undone to see an anatomized, even sexualized (“cans”
is a male heteronormative epithet for breasts that is less commonly used by women) term.
And arms can mean armaments, weapons. The space separating the two words, and their
similarity in both being four letter words ending in s, makes their connection fraught with
potential connection but no authoritative reading. One could read the page in any number
of ways, from (a) cans as objects and arms as anatomy, (b) cans as objects and arms as
weaponry, (c) cans as anatomy and arms as anatomy, or (d) cans as anatomy and arms as
weaponry (a seeming inversion of the initial literal reading, where the thinginess of one
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word becomes anatomical and the anatomical sense of the other is translated to thing).
Any choice of the reading would be arbitrary, since there are no external cues on how to
read it. Instead the words resonate as if in some quantum state of indeterminacy, both
things and body parts, sensate and inanimate. The problem of referentiality of the body
in Language Poetry isn’t avoided here—in fact, it is embraced, but with it is enmeshed an
alternative reference that makes the body reference ambiguous. While nothing about
“arms” or “cans” would contradict bodily integrity or identity, by rendering those parts
with the potential to be things, the integrity is blurred and imbued with other
significations that question what body identity is.
Steve McCaffery, among poets associated with the Language movement, is one of
the least prone to stylistic repetition and mannerism. His poems variously employ code
and image, parataxis and textual manipulation, typography and linguistic breakdowns to
probe what language can do and what it can be, in defiance of authority and convention.
In his long poem, The New Work, the body is expressed in a conventional manner in an
unconventional context. In this part of the poem there is an alternating successions of
words or phrases marked out in parentheses and those contained in quotes, all printed in a
block of text both left-and-right-justified, so as to appear as a thick column of uniform
text. One segment of this of interest to this study runs:
“open the studio” (sex as an action of assemblage) “of hues which fail to fall into
place” (bricolage) “you put your tongue in my cunt and someone else’s prick up
my ass” (form is whatever is at hand and out of that comes system) “sources of
the nerve to curiosity” (workable vaginas) [McCaffery 2002 127, 128]
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The phrasal units of this excerpt are relatively clear, befitting a poetics related to the New
Sentence. But, unlike the New Sentence, the form of the section seems to allude to other
structures. The use of quotes indicates a speaker, or at least a textual source of some
kind. Their varied forms, from an imperative command to a fragmented account, to a
description of a sex act (with ambiguity of verb tense or exactly who is involved), to a
slightly paratactic utterance (that, without context, could be read “sources of the nerve-tocuriosity” or “sources, of the nerve, to curiosity”)—all of which complicates the
provenance of the quotes, as they don’t seem to be spoken by the same person at the same
time. The parenthetical expressions could be editorial in nature, commenting on,
interpreting, or defining the quoted text.

The body, in this linguistic field, while

apparently operating as conventional reference, only does so via a lens that views
language as sourced, that views utterances as objects, making no explicit hierarchical
determinations on which sources take precedence, what their provenance is, and thus
what the parameters of their referentiality are. If the parenthetical words or phrases are
indeed some sort of editorialization of the quotes, then the most corporeally-explicit
quote, “you put your tongue in my cunt and someone else’s prick up my ass” is followed
by not some consideration of the body as conventionally coded, but in terms of
formalism, leading away from mere phenomenology or materialism to new dimensions of
the body as sign. This body-as-sign—or, more precisely, body-as-signs, is evident a few
pages into the same poem:
1760:
over
had the foot only survived (had been discovered)
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the swelled veins (the strained sinews) and the
irregular motion the irregular motion

and the motion (irregular) of the muscles
(“muscles”) might have led us into a conception of those tortures which are so
divinely expressed in the face in the face
so wonderfully marked throughout the whole
body

a

hole
see Nollekens [McCaffery 2002 136]

The dependence on sense on source is dramatized here. We read the same words
repeated, sometimes plainly “the/irregular motion the irregular motion” and then in terms
of different ways of presenting text like “and the motion (irregular)” or “the muscles /
(“muscles”)” that cause single words to signify in multiple ways. If we read “the motion
(irregular)” where “irregular” is included in parenthesis as if an afterthought, an
inessential detail, or an editorial comment, does that mean the irregularity repeated before
was also an afterthought or an inessential detail? To what extent does the consistency of
a text rely on parts mirroring each other, and, if this is necessary, what does it mean when
the parts are not issued from the same source? Do we read the repetitions as mere
repetition, or do they signify? “in the face in the face” could be speechlike reiteration,
but syntactically the sentence reads “in the face in the face . . . marked throughout the
whole body,” giving an involuted, nested image of a face distributed through a body, like
the eyes of Argus. Thus we get a composite body, a body of discrete reference, a body of
multiple sources and modes, and a body which is exhibited with a sort of mereological
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self-referencing ability not possible for macroscopic parts of material bodies. Adding to
the complexity is the apparent historical attribution to the year 1760, the reference to the
sculptor Nollekens, and the operations on language, where the word “over” is positioned
directly over the word “discovered” as if extracted from it, and, on the penultimate line
“a” lies directly below the a of “marked” in the line above, and “hole” is directly beneath
“whole.” Not only is the sign of the body composite towards multiple types of function,
but language itself generates language in a way to have the first and the last word of the
block between the historical date and the deictic imperative.
This generative propensity for language, for words to contain other words, crops
up again towards the end of the poem:
leg.

nose. eyes. teeth.
no

The string “leg.

yes

[McCaffery 2002, 144]

nose. eyes. teeth” is body-explicit and unambiguous in a way that is

uncharacteristic for Language Poetry and its project. Yet underneath this string we read
“no” just below the n-o of “nose” and “yes” underneath “eyes,” as if there are
determinations latent in the referentiality, responses, denials, affirmations, or decisions in
the material of their signs. The body, even in such an evidently positive and statementlike presentation, might be a question to which the reader must answer. The body then,
the body-as-signs, has syntactical properties that allow it to contradict its signs to be
interpretable as syntactically other; what was an affirmative sentence becomes a question;
what was unmistakable materiality becomes questionable. The added complexity here is
that the responses, the “no” and “yes” issue from the body, so while we might be led to
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think that the body is being effaced in order to complicate its syntax and reference, the
very means to which we would respond to this syntactical warping, this taking statement
as question, would be to utilize the responses provided from the linguistic materials of the
just-denied body. This complex act does not undo referentiality but subsumes
referentiality in a greater semiotic play.
The innovation of this form of body-representation in Language Poetry is not the
only way the material of language can be foregrounded in such a way to amend
conventional use of body signs into something more polysemic. McCaffery’s “Eros-ion”
is both text and a form of choreographic notation. It begins:
O
PPP PPPPP
e

E

uu U
O

oooeEoooO

ooooooP [McCaffery 2002, 232]

Such writing isn’t altogether unprecedented in Language Poetry, which, in its extremer
excursions, often expresses strings of letters, symbols, and characters, signs below the
level of semiotic resolution of the word, like Charles Bernstein’s “Lift Off,” which begins
“HH/ ie, s obVrsxr;atjrn dugh” (Bernstein 36). On the next page of McCaffery’s text,
however, we see a “Lexical Key,” wherein we read:
O = Overexcitation of Jim’s penis
P = Penetration of Jim’s Philip’s Ray’s or Eric’s penis
E = Ejaculation (Ray only)
U = Unpleasure following ejaculation
(Ray, Betty, Philips, Cathy, Dorothy and Sue)
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C = Curve of normal orgasm (Sue excluded) (McCaffery 2002 233)
While the performance of this text would bring us into an aesthetics like Pataphysics or
Dada, the use of language, of single letters, and their repetitions, is not unlike
McCaffery’s “The Baker Transformation” which uses Shakespeare’s 109th sonnet as a
source for letters set into unstable motion like a chaotic chemical system. “The Baker
Transformation” is a performance piece where individual letters are intoned, their
repetition and alternation corresponding faithfully to Shakespeare’s sonnet but lacking all
of the sonnet’s rich referentiality. “Eros-ion” looks the similar part and could be
performed as such, yet the letters, in their repetition and semantic disorder, are here
instead the source for which corporeal and somatic associations are coded. While codes
are not new or even exclusive to McCaffery in Language Poetry, being found extensively
in Hannah Weiner’s writing with semaphores and Karen Mac Cormack’s use of obsolete
words then defined according to modern equivalents, “Eros-ion” straddles many of
language’s modes, foregrounding language in both the textual and the vocal sign, the
metaphoric and cryptic nature of language, and its performative aspects. If Language
Poetry must strive to undo the referentiality of the body in order to free it from fetishes of
representation and control, then “Eros-ion” seems to say that any sort of sign is capable
of becoming corporeal. A single letter can suffice to conjure up the body, its integrity,
and its conventional roles. If Language Poetry takes up that part of the deconstructive
project which considers totality to be an impossible proposition, then totality’s converse,
nullity, seems similarly impossible whenever a sign is invoked.
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The New Sentence, as composed by poets like Ron Silliman and Lyn Hejinian,
suggests different theories of the body. If syllogistic logic is no longer a primary means
of connecting sentences, then we are led from direct reference into something more like a
referential-field. In a work like Hejinian’s The Unfollowing where individual poems are
comprised of sentences that the poet claims have no logical relation to each other,
whenever the body is instantiated multiple times in a poem, interpretation on what a body
is becomes cloudy. In poem 33, for example, one sentence says, “My eyes have filled”
(Hejinian 2016, 45). Four sentences later we read, “Very slowly with my eyes I follow
the lines between boards that link the bedroom floor to the equator.” There is also a boy
“with a 104 degree fever” earlier in the poem. While it is natural to read the “my eyes”
that appear twice in the poem as belonging to the same person, due to the stated
construction of the poem, they may not refer to the same person—one of the “my eyes”
may just as well belong to the feverish boy or some undisclosed, unnamed other person.
The body in such a poem is remarkable in that it is disarticulated. I mean this in
two ways. On a more apparent level, the body, entering in field relations and not
elaborated upon, does not operate in quite the teleological, social, and representational
means as bodies conventionally do. But I also mean that the body in a New Sentence
poem is like an article in grammar, an indication of reference. In the case of the New
Sentence the referent is often displaced, effaced, or removed. But the body as article has
been dis-artic-ulated in the sense that it is not a definite article. The seeming specificity
of the body dissolves into something more like an indefinite article—in a New Sentence,
every “the body” is more like “a body”, the “the” not being specifiable to a single definite
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object. This body as article is a body as a radical article, not definite enough to be “the
body” but often too specific, due to the language of the sentence, to be “a-“ or “any”
body. There is a thisness, a haecceity to the body in the New Sentence, but a strange
haecceity in which identity has been dissolved. It both eschews identity and clings onto
a species of identity without sufficient identification.
Jean-Luc Nancy writes of the semiotic body’s areality as a central ambiguity to
bodies, that a body is at once areal, in the sense of pertaining to an area, being a property
of place, as well as being areal in the sense of having “a lack of reality, or rather a held
reality, light, suspended” (Nancy, 42 my translation). The text-as-field of a New
Sentence poem leads to bodies behaving similar to Nancy’s concept. “My eyes” are not
real in Hejinian’s poem, not in the conventional sense of the word “real”, yet they are
held aloft and spatialized to have some form of reference to each other, occupying the
same signs in different local environments, their relatedness supposable. They occupy
the same area and thus can inform each other, filling and following possible for each,
even though the lack of syllogistic—which is to say necessary—connection always
creates a gap, a sense in which their connection is a “held reality” and thus not a natural
reality. The interesting part of this areality, of “this” body (these bodies) in the area-ofthe-poem is that the bodies aren’t the same yet construct themselves as an area from their
similitude, yet an area formed by the heterogeneity around which each particular body
reference is made. Thus the areal “eyes,” by the end of the poem, is not one “eyes” or
the other, but an “eyes” informed by the environment of either. The actual signifier of
“eyes” is, as it were, blank, like an anonymous version of a constant in a scientific
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formula, having whatever associations the reader brings to it, but being conditioned now
by its surrounding(s).

To borrow a term from set theory and topology, the areal body

sign is the result of its neighborhoods; the areal body sign changes not because of any
necessity in-itself but due to the vicissitudes of its membership in its area.
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CHAPTER 3 THE BODY IN CONCEPTUAL WRITING
While Language Poetry’s focus on the presentation of language is allied to
theories of anti-commodification, polysemy, anti-representation, and the questioning of
the conventional roles of author and reader (and by extension, literature and market), its
specific poetics can lead, as I have attempted to show, to novel conceptions on how a
body signifies. A critical response to political exigence is part of the Language poetry,
but in its denial of global coherence Language Poetry tends to relate towards culture as if
deconstructing it. While Language Poetry does produce works that involve themselves
with contemporary culture issues, like Karen Mac Cormack’s At Issue, which primarily
uses language and phrases gleaned from women’s health and style magazines, language
is often so foregrounded that more discursive levels of semanticity that would engage
with contemporary culture require some assembling by the reader. Conceptual poetry
and conceptual writing, however, in not focusing entirely on the materials of language
and the (de)constructs made possible by strict focus on these materials, but rather the
context of language, where it is found, how it is employed, and by whom or what, focus
on textual practices, mediums, means of distribution, situating the works as cultural
products or artefacts.

In this sense, even if a conceptual poem is critical of culture or

politics, it is so while situated within the discursive system of that culture. The critical
ambiguity of the work is not at the level of sign-level semiotics, as in Language Poetry,
but what exactly the conceptual poem is as a work compared to the system or discourse it
mines, relates to, or situates itself inside.
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This level of ready but layered semanticity is directly related to contemporary
culture, technology, and science. Communication systems allow for spontaneous
communication with others residing on different continents. Science has discovered new
forms of energy, with new dangers, has devised nanoscale machinery invisible to the
naked eye, has unpacked the genome of the human and experimented on recombinant and
synthetic means of genetic alteration and production. Computers have moved from the
institution to the pocket, with communication and media now being ubiquitous to those of
certain means. With these changes come both different understandings of what we are as
people and what our linguistic expressions are. Language now takes new forms, from
textspeak and tweeting, to comments in computer code, to algorithms which parse
linguistic data for corporate or institutional means. Language poetry, posed as an
extreme of the Modernist linguistic project, deriving from Mallarme, Apollinaire, Stein,
Joyce, Pound, to Cage and Burroughs, is primarily a textual practice, where its operations
occur on the page, as a sort of apotheosis to the printed medium. This is not a
completely fair assessment, since some Language Poetry is focused on performance and
some even envision language in innovative ways, such as linguistic environments
combining architecture and language by Karen Mac Cormack, yet the poem and the book
remain the resolving feature for most of the works.
Kenneth Goldsmith, one of the pioneers and exponents of conceptual writing,
wrote that “Words very well might not only be written to be read but rather to be shared,
moved, and manipulated, sometimes by humans, more often by machines, providing us
with an extraordinary opportunity to reconsider what writing is and to define new roles
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for the writer” (Uncreative Writing 15). To an era of writers familiar with Foucauldean
flows of discourse and power and one which is exposed to a seemingly endless supply of
literature, journalism, blogs, comments, etc., such a vision for writing is current. In this
formulation we see where the problems lie: words are manipulated “sometimes by
humans, more often by machines,” cluing us into the fact that in this global view of
language human concerns are just one aspect or parameter for language.

Goldsmith also

stresses the changing role of what both writing and writers are. This is different from the
Language Poetry, which dissembled and altered language itself, putting any product of
the writing process under question, whether literature, the author, or the reader.
Conceptual poetry, by viewing language as something of a stream on which flow
discourses and works, some deeply embedded and others ephemeral, envisions authorship
as a form of consumption and redistribution, changing the role of authors from
stereotyped geniuses probing their experiences to express singular works to products of
discourse who (re)package chunks of language.
“Unoriginal” is now the byword for the writer and the work. The aesthetics of
conceptual writing is more varied than the “unoriginal” and “uncreative” epithets would
suggest, ranging from what Goldsmith calls patchwriting, a practice of synthesizing text
from various sources to make a coherent whole (Uncreative Writing 7), to plagiarism,
altered presentation of existing texts, modifications of existing texts (whether by erasures,
replacements of a certain word, phrase, name, or type of word), transcripts, sampling, or
conversions of some sort, like Craig Dworkin’s Parse, which rewrites a grammar
textbook, recoding every word not as a referential, communicative word but as a
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grammatical term that the word in question is deemed to be.

While such practices may

seem purely intellectual, they are in some ways revelatory or even demystifying of the
conventional creative process. It is easy for a poet to think she is being completely
original, honing a line until it is unfamiliar yet rich, but the poet has been immersed in
certain literatures, certain dialogues about literatures, has been exposed to certain media,
to conversations with different people in different places—as well as all of the largely
unconscious appearances and juxtapositions of language afforded by advertising or the
physical proximity of different documents or media (if I were to let my eyes trace straight
lines on my bookshelf I could read inter-book formations like “Petty Bartleby Monsieur
Testament” or “Cruel Anatomy Blue Center”). This is all to say that there is likely
provenance of some sort to most creative literary production, however chewed-up,
complex, or multifaceted. One of the results of writing conceptually is that this
provenance becomes clearer. If I am rewriting a grammar textbook using only
grammatical terms, I become aware of marginal and complex cases, of certain
interpretations I may be putting on a grammar, certain priorities I might place on certain
constructions. If I am retyping an entire issue of The New York Times, as Kenneth
Goldsmith does, I become aware of the relationship of font to expression, of format into
the way I perceive the content—and it might seem that any little choice I make will have
drastic repercussions for what this plagiarized text will be. In this respect, the role of the
author may not be changed so much as multiplied; ostensibly the author becomes a
conscious participant in the language practices that in many ways have produced the
author—yet, importantly, the author also maybe becomes a more subtle version of the
traditional author, the little mysteries of creation, the burden of artistic choice and
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decisions now being placed on the interstices of sources, algorithms, and operations, and
to all the presentations afforded to the text. The conceptual author is both nonauthor and
something like a nanoauthor or cryptoauthor.
If Language poetry’s sociopoetics of the body polemicizes the individual as
constructive and composite, and power structures as synthetic, while nonetheless
presenting bodies in novel forms where they are capable of taking part in novel
significations, new contingencies, and even new memberships, Conceptual poetry, which
does not necessarily deny language’s capacity to produce structures of meaning (albeit
structures produced and maintained by media/discourse), yet which subverts
understanding of agency, provenance, and situation of meaning, understanding of what
the body is, how it functions, and what it is a part of has different theoretical
ramifications. There are questions that arise in relation to conceptual works that border
on ontological inquiries into what reading is. Take Vito Acconci’s “Removal,” which is
a representation of the alphabetized names of streets via their grid locations in
“Hagstrom’s Maps of the Five Boroughs”:
J12 G13 G12 B11 K9 B11 F11 F14 D13 C6 C14 F2 A9 A9 B10 A9 C14 J9 B12
B12 C12 C12 C12 C12 C12 C12 D13 D13 D13 D13 D13 D13 D14 D14 C5 C14
C14 C14 H13 G2 B6 F14 G4 J9 F3 F6 F6 J7 H14 D14 K12 G4 B10 C12 K11
(Against Expression, 22)
Such a mechanical presentation of alphanumeric units doesn’t lend itself to the idea of
reading, without some sort of cypher. Yet once the reader is aware of the conceit of the
work, she can appreciate the rhythms of urban design, the concentrations of proximal
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locations as evoked by letters, restricted to the A-M range and numbers, restricted from
the 1-28 range. This contrasts with a Language poem like Charles Bernstein’s “Lift
Off,” quoted in the previous chapter, where the poem’s presentation was splintered into
letters and symbols which, while hardly spelling out a single uninterrupted word, still had
its linguistic and semiotic resonances. In Acconici’s work, there are few resonances with
associative words or word roots—we are exposed to an extensive set of relations. Yet, at
the same time, those relations are themselves symbolic of a different set of relations
(relations on the map) which relate to (translate) a different set of relations (the
alphabetical ordering of the streets of Manhattan). There are layers of symbol here, none
of which are themselves disrupted in a Language-style poetics, yet the first impression of
the poem is of an abstract presentation similar to extreme Language poems. While the
lesson from Bernstein’s poem is that significance is like a weed that pops up no matter
how long you’ve spent in your garden picking and snipping and protecting, Acconici’s
work arranges signs that translate and spatialize an initial act of reading and organizing;
not only does significance arise, but this significance relates to other systems of
significance.
David Antin’s “A List of the Delusions of the Insane: What They Are Afraid Of”
illustrates how a source-mined project can instead be used to resignify the body. Antin’s
work is a 68-entry list of “actual examples of delusions of about 100 female melancholic
patients” from a footnote in William James’ The Principles of Psychology (Against
Expression, 43-45). There are no capital letters in the list and no punctuation. The
entries are loosely anaphoric, lumping together like beginnings like “being
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poisoned/being killed/being alone” and “that it is immoral to eat/that they are in hell/that
they hear people screaming,” but not exclusively so, and there is no alphabetization or
other evident means of organization other than the frequent similarities or affinities
between adjacent entries like “that evil chemicals have been placed in the earth/that evil
chemicals have entered the air” or “that houses are burning around them/that people are
burning around them/that children are burning around them/that houses are burning”
(Against Expression, 44, 45).

Reading the list is a harrowing experience, with each line

representing a person’s most overwhelming fear, whether social, familial, economic,
existential, religious, or corporeal. Encountering them, one after another, is like
witnessing a nightmare of the collective unconscious.

Because of the affinities between

entries and some of the patterns in the list, it is easy to forget that this is a clinical
composition on a gendered and diagnosed population. The “melancholic” individuals
who experienced these “delusions” are effaced in preference to a homogenizing and
pluralizing “they” or “them,” their identities made negligible and interchangeable under
the exemplariness of their symptoms. Antin’s poem reads like an Artaudian scream,
with the caveat that the readers are made aware of their clinical use, which renders the
scream less screamlike than the before picture of an idealized treatment course.
The body in this piece is a little like Acconci’s grid labels, a representation of a
representation of something which is encountered as a lived experience. Just as the
architecture, the sights and sounds of a Manhattan street are coded in the street names
that are then fragmented into gridded plots on a map, giving the readers an alternative
sense, due to the many numerical streets in Manhattan, of the way a city grows, Antin’s
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poem/list takes us several steps away from intense experiences to clinical
attributions/distancing and rearrangement into patterns and motifs whose sources may
have never been in contact with each other. The body, not of the “melancholic females”
and not of the clinician with his discipline’s focus on the human as organic, but of the
work of writing, of the arrangement of language, gives another sense. One of the
nuances of the poem is that the first 18 lines highlights no subject or sufferer, merely
objects like “the police” or gerund phrases like “being lost in a crowd” or “being unable
to close the door” (Against Expression 43). From line 19 one of the words “they,”
“their,” and “them” are used on every line. This is an important shift—for those first 18
lines, it is as if each line is a testament, a response to a question (What are you so afraid
of? “being poisoned”). Alternatively the lack of any subject represents the total clinical
subjugation of the psychiatric patient. The shift to the plural third person enacts a
distancing, a lack of direct address to the population being described. The fear, just after
the work’s halfway point, that “they have no identity,” is especially poignant and intense
given the situation of the patient, clinician, and work.
Because the subject is only ever null or pluralized into a homogeneity, the body in
the poem is monstrous. The monstrosity of the body in Antin’s poem is not chimerical
in the sense of having nonhuman parts in recombination, like a centicore or a sphinx or
even Frankensteinian in the sense of composing a coherent analog human with
decomposed human parts. Instead the monster of the poem is what “they” might
become, what might be inflicted upon “them.” This monstrous body is hollowed out,
“having no stomach/having no insides,” having “no brain.” It is altered, changing its sex,
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foul smelling, incinerated, insect-infested, vermin-covered, starving, glutted, boiling,
decapitated, disgusted, disgusting, and murdered. The body is a declension of itself, a
declension into what may not even constitute a body, and a declension intersecting
different times and tenses (“that their blood has turned to water,” “that they give off a
bad smell,” “that they will be murdered when they sleep,” my emphases). A body that
is less than a body—but a body that is profusely less than a body.
Antonin Artaud, in his 1948 radiophonic work, “Pour en finir avec le jugement de
dieu” (To Have Finished With God’s Judgment), introduced the concept of the corps sans
organes, the body-without-organs that would later be theorized by Deleuze and Guattari.
Artaud’s work ended with a commentary which included the following:
L’homme est malade parce qu’il est mal construit.
Il faut se decider à le mettre à nu pour lui gratter cet animalcule qui le démange
mortellement,
dieu,
et avec dieu
ses organes.
Car liez-moi si vous voulez,
mais il n’y a rien de plus inutile qu’un organe.

Lorsque vous lui aurez fait un corps sans organes, alors vous l’aurez délivré de
tous ses
automatisms et rendu à sa veritable liberté.
[Man is ill because he is ill-constructed. /It is necessary to put him nude in order
to scratch those microbes that fatally itch him./god/and with god/his
organs/because, tie me up if you want,/but there is nothing more useless than an
organ//When you will have made a body without organs, then you will have
delivered it from all its automatisms and rendered it truly free. my translation]
(Artaud)
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The body, as envisioned here by Artaud, is beset with two ostensible problems. Firstly,
its composition, which he envisions as an “animalcule” a la Leeuwenhoeck, particles with
some sort of agency, if only an animated material process through which the particle is
maintained and propagated, which, taken en masse makes the entire organism a site of
irritation--a sort of mob whose individuals are such irritants that the crowds as a coherent
unit cannot exist-- rather than an integral body. Secondly, there is God. God is
introduced both as problem and as ineluctably linked to organs. The idea here is of
absolute authority and teleology; whereas the animalcules, on the one hand, disturb the
body from their uncanny particles that will not resolve into a unified whole, on the other
hand there is power and reason which treats the body as rational, as fulfilling functions
and therefore situating the body not as conscious and free but as useful, which is to say,
in this conception, used. The body is used because these ends are fulfilled without
volition, without respect, without participation. The corps sans organes is a vision for
an authentic freedom for the self, which can only be achieved, in Artaud’s
psychocosmology, if the body is not separate from the mind because of physical,
conceptual, or spiritual forces, as microbiology, and as physics would have it. Deleuze
and Guattari translate this to a more philosophic métier, considering what I call the
deinstrumentalized (un-tooled, stripped of uses and usage) body as one in which all of the
predications of ideology have been excised.
Antin’s body, and many bodies in conceptual poems, get to a vision of a new kind
of body that is similar to the corps sans organes but, rather than achieving this
“liberation” through ectomic (from the suffix -ectomy, meaning the removing of an
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organ) means, they do it via aggregations, as if a Bataillean excess, multiplying the
significations and contexts of the body, can achieve similar results to Artaud, Deleuze,
and Guattari. A work like Nada Gordon’s poem from The Abuse of Mercury exemplifies
such an excess of signification. The poem consists almost exclusively of bodily states,
sensations, and excreta. The lack of elaboration of time, person, or source makes for a
defocalized body, yet one made entirely of specifics. Stool is one of the recurring
motifs:
Stools green, like chopped spinach. [entry 7]
Stools watery and offensive. [entry 18]
Even solid stool passes almost unnoticed. [entry 25]
Stool watery, jelly-like, with great amount of flatus. [entry 26]
Stool accumulates in the rectum because of lack of desire (and inability) to expel
it. [entry 29]
Stools hard, knotty, covered with mucus, followed by bleeding and cutting pain in
anus. [entry 30]
Constipation of hard, crumbling stool, covered with mucus; after stool, smarting
and soreness in the rectum. [entry 35]
Diarrhoea of green, mucous stools (occur also during menses). [entry 36]
. . . (I’ll Drown My Book, 147-152]
Similar compendiums attend cravings, discharges, pustules and excrescences, and more.
What an excess such as this gets at is a body in surfeit of significations, a body which
bears simultaneous mutually-exclusive states, but also a simultaneity of determinations
made upon it, including commentaries (“lack of desire”) and references (“occur also
during menses”). Artaud’s God hovers over this work, functionalizing the body,
sensations, and its products in the way that any symptomology necessarily produces the
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norm, which is often not a specific state, to which the symptoms deviate. If Artaud
thinks organs are at fault because they encode an ideology of reason and use, then Nada
Gordon’s body shows that a body made up of flaws encodes the identical ideology,
reinforcing the normalized body through a suspect but overwhelming apophasis. Yet the
presentation of Gordon’s poem shows this process to be unstable; it can only be
propagated—it can only be maintained—by a process of repetition, replication,
amplification, translation, rewording—yet this process of necessitated excess itself
undoes, as Gordon shows, the process to which it attempts to sustain itself.
Peter Manson’s Adjunct: an Undigest, performs a similar operation of corporeal
excess. Yet in his work, unlike the work of Antin or Gordon, the body is not situated
primarily in a clinical setting. There is an alimentary thread running through the poem,
an ingestion of foods, liquids, and drugs, a registration of metabolization, digestion,
secretion, and excretion; there are also pains, pleasures, stimuli, states, conditions, and
illnesses that coordinate the body in a way that, taken as a whole, compares to Antin and
Gordon. But these are situated within a complex of observations, notes, references, and
materials gleaned from a variety of sources. Each sentence of Adjunct was distributed to
its specific position on its specific page by a randomizing algorithm, meaning that
structures like the anaphora and affinities exhibited by Antin and the “authorial
manipulation and editing in the service of [a] sensation” employed by Gordon (I’ll
Drown my Book, 153) were not architectonic features of Adjunct’s composition. The
body is thus not situated as a sole object of code but an element among many other
elements. It is not signed in an easily deterministic fashion, since it is coded by a
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computer code that is anti-hierarchical and, indeed, anti-organizational. The excess,
then, of Manson’s poem, does not resolve neatly into a mere critique of medicalization of
the body and psyche. Its control is ceded, as if, if a critique a la Artaud on the problems
of treating the body as teleological, rational, and utilitarian is to be successful, it cannot
itself bear rationality, teleology, and viable use as part of the critique. This critique
wouldn’t even focus on the body exclusively, because such a focus would exemplify, to
some extent, a conceptualizing of the object it means to empty of its shackling concepts.
Manson’s poem brings conceptual practices of mining and patching to a more stringent
focus of critique, similar in this regard to much Language poetry, but, in a telling move,
withdraws from the world of techne as one more overdetermining affront to the body. In
order to achieve the corps sans organes, it is necessary to step away from all of the
formal contingencies that such an operation, performed by a person, entails, all of the
micro-determinations or even unconscious sublimations of reason’s regime that attend
any act of focusing on what has always been presided over by reason and use. Le corps
sans organes ne peut être réalisé que par une machine . . .
Conceptual poetics uses a wide range of documents, works, codes, and contexts to
craft its works. These lend themselves well to current digital technologies, where any
work of literature can be scanned, and coded in a variety of formats, from images, to
sound files, to various forms of text. The machine is central to this aesthetics, and
algorithms are capable of modifying conceptual poetries in novel ways, from indefinite
reproduction, modification, recursion, distribution, etc. One end of the “uncreative
writing” project is for machines to take over from humans, compiling texts with rapidity,
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complexity, and length beyond human capacities. Kenneth Goldsmith and others view
this as a step to purely machinic literatures which likely would not be understood by
humans, as if a 21st century of the aestheticist ideal art for art’s sake would be a total
dissolution of art from humanity, creator, curator, owner, and audience all external to the
project of an art that has become autonomously other.
This extreme possibility broached—and sometimes essayed—by conceptual
poetics need not be the only extreme possibility. The digital machine is distinguished by
its layers of coding, its local environments of language translated, scale by scale, down to
the binary rhythms of electric appearance and its lack. Christian Bök, however, in his
work, The Xenotext, has singled out life as another domain and discourse in which recent
technologies multiply semiotics and introduce possibilities that go beyond the historical
human. While Artaud’s anxiety considered animalcules as a compositional flaw in the
design of people—particles with their own animus, irrespective of human consciousness
or desire—contemporary genetics suffuses our composition with a language which
affects us yet which we, unaided by technology, cannot speak. The genome is a
discursive utterance that makes the animalcule, the cell with its cilia, membranes, and
nuclei, not necessarily an autonomous mechanism but a phrase in a dialogue that will
outlast the cell, relating similar phrases, developing into new phrases. Bök’s Xenotext is
an attempt to see this language for language and art. Machinic aesthetics as being
autonomously other is one end to conceptual poetics, the end that disperses all signs to
material and energetic flows for conservation, use, and development within those flows,
whether of data or fabrication; Bök’s vision, however, takes the extreme development of
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art and locates it within the organism, intimately other, at that most central structure of
life, the genome. This is not directly imprinted in the body, but is written with the
language that helps construct bodies and as such is indissoluble from bodies.
The project of The Xenotext is translate a sonnet by Bök entitled “Orpheus” (to
read, see Bök 22) into genetic code in order to insert it into the bacterium Deinococcus
radiodurans, a so-called extremophile bacteria resistant to draught and low temperatures.
Once there, replications of the gene will produce the sonnet “Eurydice” (Bök, 150).
Because of the durable properties of deinococcus radiodurans, it is believed that the
bacterium could survive mass catastrophe to the planet. Theoretically, The Xenotext
could become the only plausible instance of an “eternal work of art,” due to its potential
to survive catastrophes such as the eventual implosion of the sun.
The significance of The Xenotext for the body is manifold. Section IV, entitled
“The Virelay of the Amino Acids,” is a series of short poems coded into amino acids, the
basic building blocks of the proteins that genes encode. One such poem-code runs:
odalisques harken
calling heavenly heroes –
come home
(no hummingbirds have
copied our opulent hymns) (Bök 133)
This poem, in which individual molecules have linguistic equivalents, spells out the
amino acid Serine ( C3H7NO3). With the inclusion of a molecule to represent an
odalisque, we find a culturally dissonant term for a type of woman who in a seraglio
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would have been regarded as a maid but which in European representations was more
often a concubine or sex slave. A person who ingested food or drink with the d.
radiodurans bacteria encoded with “Orpheus” would thus embody such castes and
subjugation allied to bodies that could potentially spread in the body or take part in the
gut’s biome. The theoretical potential for this alone is wide-ranging. From being
symbolic beings whose grasp on materialism is theorized to be constructive and
symbolic, there can become parts of us that are in fact composed in symbols, symbols
which can recombine in ways unknown to us, within us. Genetic writing could become a
subtle form of tattooing—where a quote from Dowson may become, not just static and
superficial but dynamic and constitutive. There could be an écriture féminin written not
with codes handed down by the patriarchy but with homogametic gene expression in
mind. RNA transcriptions and nutrient sufficiency could become to this language of
combinations and iterations what the pen and paper had been to historical languages.
And the semiology of the body could become bewilderingly nesting, a segment of genes
coding an expressed body and an expression of a body, a sign and a signal. Where
machinic poetics leads to an X-semy, where one (a human observer) doesn’t know what
signs there are, how many, nor what they relate to, genetic polysemy would be intimately
infinite, stretching back to the first minimal life forms, expressing multiply now, creating
and reproducing simultaneously.
The mechanic and genetic semiology outline extreme for poetics and semiologies
to come. Such visions, however, risk falling into a hardline stance in which language is a
total sufficiency, ubiquitous, causal, and constitutive. The conceptual poetics’ end
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visions of autonomous coding complicate this stance by presenting themselves as
othering to humans and inaccessible unless by translation or mediation. The machines
converse in ways humans would never be able to do. The genes mix and reproduce at a
scale unobserved by us without mechanical intervention. If human consciousness and
thought is only a matter of linguistic conditioning, response, and use, conceptual poetics
can contextualize this as just a limited set of constraints or forms within a larger, perhaps
illimited set of linguistic potentials, protocols, and processes.
Yet part of the success of conceptual poetics is that it causes a consideration of
context. If Marcel Duchamp inverts a urinal and calls it a “Fountain,” we see how a
simple formal process can take something which would appear to be tautological and
give it new context; showing the convertibility between waste and sustenance, baseness
and culture. Such an operation can be interpreted as linguistic in nature, but this codeswitching only occurs because of some kind of inflection or hinge in practice, when
something is performed or used differently. The act of removing the urinal from its
cordoned-off space, taking it to an art gallery, inverting it, and signing it with a scurrilous
signature do something, not merely say something. The saying accompanies the doing;
perhaps the saying survives the doing, outlives it, evolves, but it is the act which performs
the new situation of language.
So while conceptual poetics can alter and merge existing texts in a variety of ways
or instigate protocols that take language from the merely human to an autonomy to which
a human can merely access in mediated fashion, other conceptual poetry is aware of the
situatedness of language, its relation to praxis and use. Kenneth Goldsmith’s Fidget is
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one such work. Fidget takes place over a twelve hour period on Bloomsday, June 16,
1997 (Fidget 91). During the course of those twelve hours, Goldsmith described the
bodily motions he was making aloud into a microphone which he had attached to his
body. The book, then, is a transcription of this speech. The temporality is important; it
structures the speech, segments the work, and provides a context for the events and
language—these are not just linguistic utterances or appearances, but they belong to a
given time, on a given day, to this body, so while the body is the stated “source” of the
text, it is the situation which gives it its frame of reference that moves it out of anaphoric
lists and catalogues or arrays of code and sign familiar to other conceptual texts.
A glimpse at the text shows that what it is doing is more than a description of the
body’s movements, and less:
Eyes stare straight ahead. Forefingers push on eyelids. Red seen with streaks of
green. Dots of many colors. Horizontal stripes appear in a field. Eyes ache from
behind eyeballs. More pressure applied. Bluish ghostlike images of veins seen
through closed eyelids. Eyes view retina and pupil. Press hard. Colors darken.
Veins become white. Swirling red dots seen. Pain behind eyeball. Finger
massages eyelids with great force. Hands cover eyes. Dots appear blue. Black
field with bright blue veins. Sudden red shift. More light penetrates. Colored
shapes appear, ending in center of pupil. Forefingers massage tear ducts. Blue
seen. (Fidget 39)
There are bodily movements, pushing, pressure, massaging, and covering, but there is
also reported sensation, vision, aches, and pains, illustrating that the book doesn’t simply
focus on body acts but also delves into phenomenology. While a bodily motion or act
may be thought of as rational (I pressed down; this motion consisted of an initial force
and a terminal release; it was finite and discrete) and end-oriented, the phenomenological
is notoriously labile, hazily-bounded, in flux, field- not object- oriented, and not
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delimited with teleological structures, relating to language and the body but always as
active as time. There is a curation involved in this, a sense of testimony that may seem
somewhat arbitrary to anybody who has ever tried to describe in words what is seen when
the eyes are closed.
Such a curation is evident with the masturbation scene that begins the section
labelled “13:00.” It begins:
Thumb screws. Wrist flicks two hundred seventy degrees. Right hand moves
toward body one hundred eighty degrees. Hand moves in clockwise semi-circular
direction. Fingers release. Hand rests, grasps and lifts. Lips open. Head tilts backward.
Swallow. Swallow. Mouth floods with saliva. Tip of finger scratches outside of nose.
Hand grabs. Elbow lifts. Elbow lowers. Elbow out. Body stretches. Thumb and four
fingers grasp. Elbow raises. Hand drops. Motion reverses. Right hand grasps. Lifts.
Lips open. Head tilts backwards. Swallow. Swallow. Hand drops. Rests. Body moves
backward. Hands simultaneously grasp and pull down. Back slumps. Left hand grasps
penis. Squeezes at base. (Fidget 28)
There is a mixture of scales and resolution. We read quasi-precision with the
“two hundred seventy degrees” and “one hundred eighty degrees” of the first lines, clean
orthogonal numbers. Yet we are not shown everything—just what is being grasped and
grabbed. In the sequence “Hand drops. Motion reverses. Right hand grasps,” is the
hand that drops different or the same as the hand that grasps? If it is the same, what
warrants its being singled out for grasping while not for dropping?

Why in this scene of

bodily manipulation is there no attendant sensory qualia like there were to the visualized
streaks, dots, and veins of the eyelid-pressing scene?
Part of the fascination of this text is that it presents us with a level of detail,
verbally, that goes beyond natural discourse. There is a sense of alienation in reading a
text describing something like the drinking of coffee as:
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Muscles tighten in arm. Coffee cup to lips. Tilt. Coffee swallowed and cup
placed on table. Coffee cup to lips. Coffee swallowed. Cup placed on table.
Draw mucus. Peristalsis. Cup to mouth. Coffee flows between teeth and gum
inside cheek. Tip of tongue caresses inside of cheek. Tongue probes gully where
cheek meets gum. Tongue muscles stretch, flex, and strain. Tongue runs along
canal in front of teeth. Elbows lean against arms. Bones exact pressure. Cup to
mouth. (Fidget 23)
The minute detailing sometimes erodes the sense of definiteness and performativity of
tasks mediated with the body. While this detail ostensibly serves a level of authenticity
or truth, it is merely a sort of magnification of the approximations, interpretations, and
choices always at play in describing the body. Instead of the density of detail serving to
render the body, as configured by language, as somehow more concrete, it emphasizes
the patterned, conventional, and selective nature of corporeal description.

Why, for

instance, do “muscles tighten in arm” for the first sip but not any subsequent sip? What
has the tongue been doing before it “probes gully where cheek meets gum”? The
apparent accuracy of the text masks what is actually a problem for language in its
depiction and relation to the body.
The text situates the body in language but does not reproduce it. Fidget shows
how difficult that would be. This is for many reasons. The body is interior and exterior.
Muscles, bones, and organs operate as the same time as lips, eyelids, hairs, fingernails,
knuckles, knees, skin. Determining what the body is, by focusing on a part, always
performs a limitation of some sort. I could say “Fingertip scratches,” which describes a
corporeal event but fails to account for the totality of what goes on, a nerve impulse in the
brain traveling down the spine into nerves that eventually make their way to the hand, a
motion in the finger that coincidentally moves tendons in the hand, tendons connected to
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muscles connected to the wrist, effectively rippling into small contractions of forearm
muscles—all of which are dependent on metabolic and respiratory systems to provide
energy, etc. While there are discrete bones, muscles, and tendons in the body, the parts
are all interconnected such that nothing can be performed in isolation of other parts. To
describe the body at all is to make assumptions, which, interpreted differently, is
tantamount to admitting to Artaud’s poorly-constructed and automatic body (parts
beyond one’s control, parts beyond immediate consciousness) on one hand or the
influence of various discourses and conventions on the other. Linguistically, the body is
only ever produced. Linguistically, the body is only ever impossible, not totalizeable in
any single utterance or document, always supplementary and intra-contingent in such a
way to render the only possible whole the sum of the limitless combinations of parts, yet
the parts to only have sufficient definition by their deduced relations.
Fidget thus does what such extremes of conceptual poetics as The Xenotext and
Adjunct fail to do: to take the failure of language as one of the most productive sources
of language. While poets such as Caroline Bergvall examine the “glitch” of language,
sites where language is disrupted, corrupted, or otherwise failed, Fidget does so with the
situation of language, on the relationship between produced language and practice.
Fidget makes obvious insights about the nature of our awareness of our own actions, the
language by which we code or account for the physical acts we accomplish, and what
vocabularies are associated with such a code. But if conceptual poetics ends with
something like an art for art’s sake that ends up in a discourse dissociated from the
human into the mechanical or the genetic, Fidget shows that language is constrained to a
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fraught relationship to practice, and that any such relationship to practice is selective
rather than necessary. With endpoints of art tending towards the inhuman or posthuman,
selection proves to be one of the central manners in which language becomes thought or
even lived experience. The conceptual body, as much as it is coded, sourced, mixed,
presided over by algorithms, is still a body that must be selected to be a body because of
parameters that enable it to be recognized as a body.
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Breton, André. Manifests du surréalisme. Paris: J Pauvert, 1962. Print.
Butler, Judith. Bodies that Matter. Abingdon, New York: Routledge Classics, 2011. Print.
Carroll, Noël. "Avant Garde Art and the Problem of Theory." The Journal of Aesthetic
Education 29.3 (1995): 1-13.
Coolidge, Clark. Selected Poems 1962-1985. Barrytown: Station Hill, 2017. Print.
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. Capitalisme et Schizophrénie 1: L'Anti-Oedipe. Paris:
Les Éditions de Minuit, 2018. Print.
Détrez, Christine. La Construction sociale du corps. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2002. Print.
Duarta, Bárbara Nascimento. "Entangled Agencies: New Individual Practices of HumanTechnology Hybridism Through Body Hacking." Nanoethics 8 (2014): 275-285.
Duchamp, Marcel. Duchamp du signe suivi de Notes. Ed. Michel Sanouillet and Paul
Matisse. Paris: Flammarion, 2008. Print.
Dworkin, Craig and Kenneth Goldsmith, Against Expression: An Anthology of
Conceptual Writing. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2011. Print.
Foucault, Michel. La volonté de savoir. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1976. Print.
Goldsmith, Kenneth. Fidget. Toronto: Coach House Books, 2000. Print.
Hejinian, Lyn. The Unfollowing. Oakland: Omnidawn Publishing, 2016. Print.
Janacek, Gerald. Zaum : the transrational poetry of Russian futurism. San Diego: San
Diego State University Press, 1996. Print.
Lautréamont, Comte de. Les Chants de Maldoror. Paris: Gallimard, 1973.
Le Breton, David. L'adieu au corps. Paris: Éditions Métailié, 2013. Print.
Mac Cormack, Karen. Tale Light: New & Selected Poems 1984-2009. Toronto:
BookThug, 2010. Print.
Manson, Peter. Adjunct: An Undigest. London: Barque Press, 2009. Print.
67

Marinetti, F.T. ""La Danza Futurista"." Manifesti Del Futurismo. Milano: Abscondita
SRL, 2008. 181-187. Print.
McCaffery, Steve. ""Cacophany, Abstraction, and Potentiality: The Fate of the Dada
Sound Poem"." McCaffery, Steve. The Darkness of the Present: Poetics,
Anachronism, and the Anomaly. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2012.
Print.
—. North of Intention: Critical Writings 1972-1986. New York, Toronto: Roof Books,
Nightwood Editions, 1986. Print.
—. Seven Pages Missing: Volume II: Previously Uncollected TExts 1968-2000. Toronto:
Coach House Books, 2002. Print.
Nancy, Jean-Luc. Corpus. Trans. Richard A. Rand. New York: Fordham University
Press, 2008. Print.
Peoc'h, Mickaël and Gwénola Druel. "Body-hacking et logique supplétive: un mode
contemporain de traitement du corps." Cliniques méditerranéennes 96 (2017):
133-145.
Perelman, Bob. The marginalization of poetry : language writing and literary history .
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. Print.
Philip, M. NourbeSe. ZONG! Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2008. Print.
Render, Meredith M. "The Law of the Body." Emory Law Journal 63 (2013): 549-605.
Silliman, Ron. demo to ink. Tucson: Chax Press, 1992. Print.
—. The New Sentence. New York: Roof Books, 1987. Print.
Smith, Gavin JD. "Surveillance, Data and Embodiment: On the Work of Being
Watched." Body & Society 22.2 (2016): 108-139.
Warwick, Kevin. "The Cyborg Revolution." Nanoethics 8 (2014): 263-273.
Watten, Barrett. Questions of Poetics: Language Writing and Consequences. Iowa City:
University of Iowa Press, 2016. Print.
Wilde, Oscar. The Critic as Artist. New York: Mondial, 2007. Print.
Wilson-Barnao and Natalie Collie. "The droning of intimacy: bodies, data, and sensory
devices." Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 32.6 (2018): 733-744.

68

